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Abstract 
Managing  food price instability is a long standing policy challenge, which, with mixed experiences of 
agricultural price policy reforms, has re-emerged as a contemporary policy issue. This is particularly true for 
Ethiopia, where managing food price stability continues to be a formidable policy challenge. The objective of this 
paper is to examine the underlying causes of cereal price instabilities and to assess the policy options to manage 
them. It undertakes three tasks: (a) analyzes the sources and degree of cereal price instability, (b) discusses the 
viability of various policy options, and (c) critically reviews the country’s past, ongoing, and emerging policies 
for food price stabilization. The results show that the determinants of price stability—infrastructure, information, 
and institutions—are at low levels of development; both production and price variability are high, and despite this 
continued high variability in prices, price risks mitigation has lost its importance in the country’s policy agenda. 
By analyzing market-based and non market-based policy options, as well as recent trends in the cereal markets, 
the paper argues and concludes that reliance on any single option may not produce the expected results. A 
combination of the two will be desirable, especially in the short run. 
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Introduction 
Agricultural households in developing countries face a 
variety of risks. The most visible manifestation of 
these risks is high food price instability, which, 
because of its inherent economic and political 
implications, has attracted the attention of almost all 
actors in food policy making over the past few 
decades. Politicians want food price stability 
irrespective of their ideology, public administrators 
have struggled in making food price policies work, and 
researchers have debated over the ways and means of 
ensuring food price stability. However, all actors agree 
on one point—i.e.,, the dire consequences of price 
instability on consumers, producers, as well as on 
overall economic growth. For poor consumers, 
consequences of price instability are severe. Since a 
large share of their income is spent on food, an 
unusual price increase forces them to cut down food 
intake, take their children out of school, or, in extreme 
cases, simply to starve. Even when such price shocks 
are temporary, they can have long term economic 
impacts in terms of nutritional well-being, labor 
productivity, and survival chances (Hoddinott 2006 
and Myers 2005). At the macro level, country studies 
have argued that price instability may result in 
macroeconomic instability, social unrest, and overall 
reduction in economic growth (Timmer 1988 and 
1997). 
Until the onset of the structural adjustment programs 
(SAP), the policy response was direct government 
intervention through food marketing 
boards/parastatals, involving price control and 
restrictions on both internal and external trade. 
Beginning in the 1980s, donors and other international 
agencies began promoting the reform of food 
marketing boards and price policies as part of the SAP. 
The momentum for reforms was provided by the 
dominant view at the time that direct marketing 
interventions were too expensive in terms of both 
budgetary and implicit social costs. However, such 
experiences have been mixed, and whether the reforms 
provided a positive price incentive is a subject of 
considerable debate (Barrett 1997; Jayne et al., 2002; 
Dorward et al. 2004). 
Thus, there is a growing recognition that food price 
instability and risks are important problems in 
developing countries and finding appropriate policies 
to deal with these predicaments has re-emerged as a 
contemporary policy issue (World Bank 2005).  There 
are two additional reasons for the re-emergence of 
food price stabilization in developing countries: (a) 
global climate changes, and (b) unusually low levels of 
world food stock. There is growing concern that global 
climate change is likely to expose poor countries to 
draughts, floods, and other extreme climatic events 
that can increase the risk of food price shocks. The 
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historically low level of world food stock is also a 
serious concern, as even a small production shock in 
large countries, such as China and India, can send 
major shock waves through world grain markets. This 
has severe implications for developing countries, 
especially ones that face a food deficit and have 
limited import capacity due to low foreign currency 
reserves. For example, a sudden increase in food 
import may lead to worsening of a poor country’s 
balance of trade, causing a devaluation of the 
currency, and making import more expensive in local 
currency (Hazell et al. 2005).  
Ethiopia is such a country. It is constrained by a 
limited import capacity; food price variability in its 
domestic market is very high, the country’s integration 
with the world market is low, and the country has 
experienced both price spikes and collapses in recent 
years. Furthermore, despite the government’s almost 
complete withdrawal from the market, price variability 
has actually worsened rather than improving in recent 
years. Using available data on two internationally 
traded cereals, maize and wheat, this paper: (i) 
analyzes the sources of price instability, (ii) reviews 
the viability of various policy options to address price 
instability, and (iii) discusses how the country’s price 
policies fare in terms of viability and policy 
justifications.  
Sources of price instability 
The price of any given commodity is the final outcome 
of an exchange process we call market,  and the 
outcome is only as good as the process is able to 
deliver. Thus, the price of a commodity can be right 
only if the process of exchange is right. Three critical 
determinants of an efficient process of exchange (i.e. 
market) are infrastructure, institutions, and 
information. The following example can help illustrate 
the point. The experiences of the “getting prices 
right”  campaign of the 1980s, which involved 
dismantling parastatals, suggest that the results of the 
campaign varied widely across countries. While 
liberalization led to higher price variability and 
reversing of polices in some African countries, it was 
remarkably successful in China and Vietnam—
arguably because these countries had well-developed 
infrastructure and institutions. Therefore, the starting 
point for understanding the sources of price variability 
in any given country should begin through an analysis  
of the factors that influence the “process of exchange.” 
The terms “infrastructure and institutions” encompass 
a wide range of factors that contribute towards 
improving market efficiency. For the sake of clarity, 
we consider four broad sources of price instability, 
which are elaborated below.   
Agro-climatic factors 
The hostility of Mother Nature has historically been 
one of the main sources of vulnerability of peasant 
households. Drought, floods, and endemic infestation 
have always played roles behind food insecurity and 
resultant human tragedies.  
The production from weather dependent agriculture, as 
is the case in most African countries, can be as 
unpredictable as the weather itself. This is reflected by 
the variability in production within and across years. It 
has been amply demonstrated that yield variability 
translates into price variability; and the more a 
country’s agriculture depends on weather the more is 
the variability in yields and hence the prices 
(Anderson and Hazell 1989).   
Simple analysis of time series data shows that this is 
indeed the case in Ethiopia. The results of yield 
variability, measured with the Cuddy La Valle Index 
(CLVI) for wheat and maize, suggest that yield rates 
are highly volatile across regions and over time (Table 
1).  Maize yields appear to be more volatile than wheat 
with estimated index ranging from as high as 46 for 
the Somale region and as low as 6 for the Benishangul 
region. While the estimates for wheat are lower than 
those for maize, they are still substantially higher 
compared to other wheat producing countries in the 
developing world. For example, CLVI for wheat in 
India and Pakistan, two major wheat growing 
countries in South Asia, are 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. 
These are significantly lower than any given wheat 
growing region in Ethiopia. What explains such a high 
variability? Clearly, weather dependence is large part 
of explanation. In India, about 35 percent of cropped 
land is irrigated at the national level, as opposed to 
around 2 percent in Ethiopia. 
Infrastructure and information 
The physical infrastructure and efficient flow of 
information are perhaps the most important sources of 
price variability and food security crisis. 
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Indeed, famines and acute food insecurity have 
historically been localized phenomena and many of 
them are named after a specific region of a country, 
such as the Wello famine in Ethiopia, and the Bengal 
and Madras famines in India. The classic example is 
the Bengal Famine of 1943, which tragically 
demonstrated how a small decline in food production 
can trigger massive food insecurity in the absence of 
infrastructure, information, and risk mitigating 
institutions. Food price stabilization policies have their 
roots in such tragic experiences.  
Where does Ethiopia stand in terms of these 
infrastructure and information flows? We have 
examined data from the World Development Indicator 
(WDI) database on the road network, telephone lines, 
and ownership of radio and television. Analysis of this 
data shows that in 2000, the country had about 31,000 
kilometers of road network (equivalent to 0.03 km per 
square km of land area), only about four out of a 
thousand people owned a phone, and only six out of a 
thousand people owned a television. These numbers 
are very low, even compared to other developing 
countries in Africa and Asia. More importantly, time 
series analysis suggests that the road network changed 
from 28 thousand kilometers in 1990 to only 31 in 
2000.  The total road network, normalized by the land 
area of the country, indicates that there has hardly  
 
 
been any change in road infrastructure in the country 
since 1990. Similarly, while ownership of televisions 
has increased dramatically over the past three decades 
in other countries, it has remained relatively flat in 
Ethiopia (Rashid and Assefa 2006).  
 Incomplete markets: Credit and Insurance 
Living always involves risks, but over time the human 
race has learned how to manage or cope with them. 
The credit and insurance markets are the outcomes of 
such human learning in the process of evolution. 
However, in developing countries, these institutions 
are largely incomplete or non-functional, and thus 
inadequate to address the credit and insurance needs of 
a vast majority of households. This indirectly 
contributes to agricultural risks and price instability. 
For instance, if credit market is well-functioning, 
households can borrow to maintain a certain level of 
consumption, or to avoid distress sales in the face of 
negative income shocks. It is often the case in many 
developing countries where farmers have to sell a 
portion of their crops immediately after the harvest to 
pay off loans, pay wages, school fees, or to meet other 
social obligations.  
The same argument can be applied to insurance 
markets. Farmers in developing countries have great 
difficulty in dealing with weather-related income 
shocks due to missing insurance markets. Crop failure 
due to drought, for example, can force households 
Table 1: Regional Variability in Maize and Wheat Yields 
Regions 
Wheat Maize 
CV CLVI*  CV  CLVI 
Tigray 22.95  14.97  26.18  23.88 
Afar --  --  44.99  36.41 
Amhara 15.73  15.66  15.09  14.89 
Oromia 11.16  9.71  9.42  9.00 
Somale 38.02  29.93  46.74  46.15 
Benishangule --  --  6.87  6.82 
SNNPR 18.34  17.36  7.98  7.76 
Gambella --  --  26.10  24.83 
Harari 10.93  10.53  18.88  16.95 
Addis Ababa  18.92  18.74  --  -- 
Dire Dawa  --  --  28.33  23.16 










1 , where CV 
is the coefficient of variation and R
2 is the coefficient of determination for log-linear time trend regression 
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otherwise above the poverty line into poverty as they 
have to sell their productive assets to meet 
consumption requirements and production costs. As 
we shall see in the next section, the development of 
credit and insurance markets is also critical to ensure 
food price stability through market-based institutions.  
 Other factors 
There are three other factors that can generate food 
price instability in a country: (i) high world price 
variability, (ii) large social safety net (SSN) programs, 
and (iii) large aid flow for emergency assistance 
programs. The world staple food market has 
historically been thin, highly volatile, and heavily 
influenced by agricultural policies in developed 
countries (Timmer 1996).   Many studies have 
documented that high variability in world prices can 
transmit to domestic markets and worsen price 
instability. In fact, this was one of the central 
justifications that countries in Asia used to protect 
their cereal markets when they embarked on the green 
revolution (Rashid et al. 2007). For Ethiopia, this is 
less significant, as most of the cereals in the country 
are non-tradable.  However, it is interesting to note 
that domestic price variability in Ethiopia, particularly 
for maize, is higher than in the world market (Rashid 
and Assefa 2006).  
For Ethiopia, the two other factors are particularly 
important. The country has large safety net programs 
that combine both food and cash transfer (add figures). 
It is true that these are essential social intervention 
programs, justifiable irrespective of the level of 
development of a country. However, if they are not 
managed properly their operations can have 
destabilizing effects on the markets, especially if the 
programs are large relative to the country’s food 
economy. Although the direction of the price change 
may be different, both food transfers and cash transfers 
under SSN can affect the price. For instance, if the 
beneficiaries receive food under SSN, it will lower 
their effective demand from the market, which in turn 
will lead to a decline in prices.  
The last factor that can contribute to price instability is 
large inflow of food aid. While the benefits of food aid 
supply during emergency situations cannot be denied, 
excessive flows can depress market prices to the 
detriment of local producers, lowering levels of 
production and farmer incomes.  Ethiopia is one of the 
largest recipients of food aid, where total food aid 
accounted for 13 percent of cereal utilization in the 
country during 1999-2003 (Rashid et al. 2006). This is 
a conservative estimate. In terms of total human 
consumption, the food aid’s share is at least twice as 
high because, in addition to human consumption, 
cereal utilization includes feed, seed, post harvest 
losses etc. (FAO 2004). Clearly, it is a large share and, 
depending on the mode of distribution, can produce 
disincentive effects on both producers and traders. 
Available policy options 
The current stock of price stabilization policies 
includes both “market based and non-market based 
options” with the former generally practiced in 
developed countries and the latter in developing 
countries. The non-market based options—such as 
dual pricing, variable tariffs, and subsidizing storage—
are justified on the arguments of “market failure”. In 
fact, three commonly cited rationales for public 
intervention in agricultural markets—i.e., (i) 
inadequate infrastructure and information flows, (ii) 
incomplete risk mitigating institutions (e.g., credit and 
insurance markets), and (iii)  lack of safeguards 
against external shocks—can all be supported as cases 
of market failures. Market-based options—such as 
commodity exchanges, warehouse receipts, and crop 
insurance—are viable only if the market fundamentals 
are in place and there is an enabling regulatory and 
legal environment. Both building market fundamentals 
(e.g., infrastructure and information) and creating an 
enabling environment take time and, like many other 
developing countries, Ethiopia lacks these critical 
elements of well functioning markets. This implies 
that some forms of non-market intervention may be 
justified in the short to medium terms. In the next 
section, we provide a brief discussion on this issue in 
the context of past, ongoing, and emerging policy 
discussions.  
A review of ethiopia’s policy responses 
Over the past three decades, Ethiopia has 
experimented with a whole spectrum of agricultural 
price policies that ranges from parastatals-centric 
control through production quota and trade control 
during the central planning regimes, to some sort of 
dual pricing approach during 1992-99, to total 
liberalization (except security reserve and safety nets) 
with ad hoc interventions in recent years. A summary 
of the government proclamation and rationales for 
reform are presented in Table 2.  Two points are very 
clear from the table. First, despite very high variability 
in prices and production, price risk mitigation has 
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progressively lost its importance in policy agenda. The 
country’s food marketing parastatal, the Ethiopian 
Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), continues to exist, 
but its major mandate is export promotion, not price 
stabilization. Second, the policy focus has shifted more 
towards emergency and disaster management, which 
are important in their own rights. However, ensuring 
price stability is critical for farmers to make decisions 
about investment, crop portfolio choices, and moving 
towards more sustainable forms of commercialization 
and diversification.  
Following up a high level report, released in 
November 2005, the country has embarked on setting 
up an agricultural commodity exchange. The 
government has committed to simultaneously 
addressing many of the viability conditions to make it 
work.  These include setting up grades and standards, 
introducing warehouse receipts, and setting up 
strategically located electronic hubs for price 
transmission. The exchange is expected to go into 
operation in late 2007. The hopes are high; the 
government and its development partners have gone 
through a rigorous consultation process to identify 
constraints and take necessary measures to address 
them. However, recent experiences with such 
initiatives in Africa as well as political sensitivity to 
cereal prices increase the call for caution. Of the many 
initiatives to set up commodity exchanges, only South  
Africa’s SAFEX turned out to be successful, perhaps 
because the country is at much higher level of 
development. Although they appeared successful in 
the initial years, both Zimbabwe and Zambia 
suspended commodity exchanges following sharp rises 
in cereal prices. Recent experiences suggest that 
Ethiopia is likely to face similar problems. The 
country’s cereal markets have been behaving 
differently from their historical patterns for more than 
a year and half. Despite consecutive years of good 
harvests, prices of major cereals have been rising 
sharply since late 2005. The food component of the 
national consumer price index has increased from 
about 8 percent in 2003 to 19 percent in 2006, with an 
average annual increase of about 13 percent.  This is 
indeed puzzling and has been a major concern for the 
Government of Ethiopia. As policy responses to this 
situation, government banned cereal exports in early  
2006, introduced urban food rationing in April 2007, 
and had to issue an announcement warning traders and 
business entities not to hoard essential food 
commodities. These experiences suggest that market-
based options, such as commodity exchanges, alone 
are not likely to solve the problems of cereal price 
instability—some non-market based policies may be 
necessary at least in the short run. The challenge will 
be to make such interventions transparent, consistent, 
and credible to minimize distortions to both production 
and trade incentives.  
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Table 2. Declining Emphasis on Managing Food Price Instability 
Proclamations/ 
Regulation Numbers 
Agency responsible  Specifics tasks on price stabilization 
Regulation 
No. 104/1992 
Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise 
(EGTE) 




EGTE  Stabilization is a mandate, but emphasis is 
placed on export promotion.   
Proc. No. 380/2004  (EGTE  No explicit mention of price stabilization, but 
performing the task on an ad hoc (as and 
when required) basis.  
Reg.  No. 67/2000  Emergency Food Security Reserve 
Administration 
Maintain strategic reserves to manage fast 
and slow-onset of emergencies  
Proc. No. 212/2000  National Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness Fund Establishment 
Objective is to help implement Employment 
generation under food security programs.  
Source: Compiled from various public documents 
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